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ABSTRACT 
Public Wi-Fi networks are now widely available in many countries. 
Though undoubtedly convenient, such networks have potential 
security and privacy risks. The aim of this study was to understand 
if people are aware of those risks, and – if so – why they decide to 
take them. We set up an experimental free Wi-Fi network at 14 
locations in central London, UK, for a period of 150 hours, and 
people connected most often to use instant messaging, search 
engines, and social networks, and sensitive data (such as name, date 
of birth, and sexual orientation) were transmitted. We subsequently 
investigated people’s risk awareness and risk behaviour through 
semi-structured interviews with 14 participants, and an online 
scenario-based survey with 102 participants. The majority of 
participants said they would use public Wi-Fi under circumstances 
where the risks taken are not consistent with maximising utility. 
Female participants rated the risks associated with public Wi-Fi 
use, more highly – and yet more females than males said they 
would use them to save their data plans. These findings align with 
insights from behavioural economics, specifically the insight that 
people can misjudge risky situations and do not make decisions 
consistent with expected utility theory. 
CCS Concepts 
• Security and privacy ➝ Network security ➝ Mobile and 
wireless security • Security and privacy ➝ Human and societal 
aspects of security and privacy ➝ Privacy protections 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Public Wi-Fi networks have become ubiquitous in urban areas over 
the past decade, offered in high-traffic areas such as transport hubs, 
coffee shops, or near popular tourist attractions. Many of these 
public Wi-Fi networks are open and free to use, and do not require 
users to authenticate. But as a number of previous studies have 
shown, most of these networks are unsecured, so when connecting 
users expose themselves – knowingly or unknowingly - to security 
and privacy risks.  
We investigated people’s connection behaviour and perceptions of 
associated risks and benefits around three questions: 1. How often 
will people connect to an insecure public Wi-Fi network, in a busy 
city centre (London, UK)? 2. Do they expose sensitive information 
when using those networks?, and 3. How do people reason about 
the costs and benefits associated with public Wi-Fi use? The last 
question is particularly intriguing as mainstream economic theories 
– specifically expected utility theory, argues that people make 
decisions rationally using mathematical decision-making rules 
whilst behavioural economics has demonstrated extensive 
evidence of bounds to rationality consistent with people 
misjudging risky situations – a theme developed in the context of 
prospect theory and other behavioural theories of risky decision-
making. 
We conducted our study into three parts. First, we examined how 
often and for what purpose, people will connect to public Wi-Fi 
networks. We set up our own open public Wi-Fi network at 14 
public locations in central London, for a total of 150 hours. The 
second part of the study investigates security and privacy 
implications. We inspected the data packets to see if sensitive 
information was transmitted insecurely. We found applications and 
websites leaking cookies that contained personal information and 
online transaction history.  
In the third part of our study, we elicit the reasons why people use 
public Wi-Fi. We interviewed 14 participants to gain preliminary 
understanding of their rationales and used the result to design 
questions in the subsequent scenario-based online survey. We 
conducted this survey with 102 participants to determine if their 
decisions to connect to public Wi-Fi can be explained in terms of 
expected utility. We found that a significant proportion of our 
participants did not make choices predicted by utility theory and 
instead were consistent with insights from behavioural economics, 
specifically the argument that people do misjudge risky situations 
and do not make decision mathematically as proposed in the utility 
theory. We also found a correlation with gender, employment 
status, and perceived security of pubic Wi-Fi.  
The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides related work, 
and Section 3 introduces the methodology. We present the results 
in Section 4 and discuss the application of our findings in Section 
5, before presenting the conclusion in Section 6. 
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2. RELATED WORK 
Wireless networks provide a convenient way for people to connect 
to the Internet, and many businesses see it as beneficial to offer free 
Wi-Fi [15]. In the UK, there are now approximately 269,000 free 
Wi-Fi hotspots [14], and more than 200 underground stations in 
London now provide free Wi-Fi [44] – which for instance helps 
people to work out alternative travel in case of disruptions. 
However, there are security risks to using a public Wi-Fi network. 
In this section, we explore the relevant literature of the extent of 
public Wi-Fi usage, the security and privacy implication of using 
such networks, and the decision making process for using public 
Wi-Fi network. Each is discussed in turn. 
2.1 Extent of public Wi-Fi usage 
A number of studies report people use public Wi-Fi to perform a 
range of online activities. A study of public Wi-Fi usage in 
Australia [29] noted that people used public Wi-Fi for interpersonal 
support, emails and social media such as Facebook to communicate 
with friends and family  - but also to ‘kill time’ by surfing the 
Internet. A study in Seattle and Boston [20] found that people use 
public Wi-Fi for email and for instant messaging their friends and 
families.  However, both studies collected self-reported behaviour 
(survey and interviews) rather than observed behaviour. 
In 2012, Hare et al. [23] set up an experimental Wi-Fi network on 
public transit buses in the northern Midwest of the US, and found 
users mainly use the network to access entertainment content. In a 
similar experiment at the ACM conference in San Diego in 2002 
[5], 195 distinct devices connected to the researchers’ Wi-Fi 
networks and more than 50% of generated traffic was Web and 
SSH traffic. Another study by Cheng et al. conducted at 15 airports 
across the US, Germany, Australia, and India [12] reports that 
people used unsecure public Wi-Fi at the airports for online 
shopping and social networking. A study conducted in Canada [34] 
showed that cafés are the most popular spots for unsecured public 
Wi-Fi connection. A study in Nottingham in 2014 [35] found that 
users use the experimental public Wi-Fi networks to access 
entertainment content. The study took place in Aspley - a medium 
sized British city with a population of around 300,000. 
Many people in the UK now have data plans, and so do not have to 
rely on unsecured public networks to access the services that 
people were found to use in previous studies. Does this mean public 
Wi-Fi is used less? The continuing increase in the number being 
offered suggests there still is demand. 
Hence, our first hypothesis;  
H1: People connect to public Wi-Fi and use them for a range of 
purposes. 
2.2 Security and privacy implications of using 
public Wi-Fi 
A malicious user can intercept data sent over unsecured public   
Wi-Fi [26]. In the UK, the City of London Police warned that 
criminals use public Wi-Fi to intercept credit card details by setting 
up evil twin (spoof) networks or Man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attacks [14] – this has also been reported elsewhere ([3], [7], 
[33],[37] [39]).  
The broadcast nature of public Wi-Fi also increases the risk of data 
being intercepted and potentially read by anyone within the range 
of the Wi-Fi network [28]. A large-scale study conducted at 15 
airports across the US, Germany, Australia, and India [12] 
discovered that two thirds of users leak private information such as 
pictures of merchandise that a user had previously browsed and 
social groups of interest whilst accessing the Internet at the airport. 
Another study by Chen et al. [11] found sensitive information such 
as medical history, family income, and investment secrets leaking 
from a Wi-Fi side channel. A study conducted at two locations in 
London on behalf of F-Secure [15], found one username and 
password being visible as they pass through the experimental      
Wi-Fi hotspot. However, the second experiment lasted for only 30 
minutes which is a relatively small window to fully draw a 
conclusion on. We wanted to conduct a similar experiment in our 
study, but over a longer time period. 
Based on the findings from previous studies and news reported, we 
hypothesise that security and privacy of data can be compromised 
whilst being transmitted on public Wi-Fi.  
Hence, our second hypothesis; 
H2: Security and privacy of data can be compromised on public  
Wi-Fi network. 
2.3 Reasons for using public Wi-Fi 
Many people use public Wi-Fi because it offers them utility. 
Swanson et al. [38] found that - although users were aware of 
certain risks - they often do not believe the risk will be realised. 
Their study used a qualitative approach. We wanted to check the 
awareness of security risks in a more systematic way. Klasnja et al. 
[28] suggested that public Wi-Fi users believe the security 
measures on their devices will protect them, but their study did not 
explain the decision-making process for such behaviour. Ferreira 
et al. [16] investigated the effects of trust and context when 
choosing public Wi-Fi network’s names and found that adding 
security or freeness in the network’s names does not bias user’s 
preference in familiar environments, but the opposite behaviour 
was observed in unfamiliar contexts. Ferreira et al. [17] also 
examined whether the graphical cues (specifically, a security 
padlock and signal strength bars) convey their intended messages 
in informing users of the security of a given public Wi-Fi network. 
They found that participants’ understanding of the cues and the 
circumstances are the real motivators behind the participants’ 
choices. 
Studies that investigate the decision-making process that leads 
people to connect to public Wi-Fi are limited. Ferreira et al. [18] 
used the UML sequence diagram to explain the steps that the user 
undertakes when connecting to public Wi-Fi networks. However, 
their models focused on pay-per-use hotspots and Internet Service 
Provider (ISP)’s homespot (i.e. a residential router provided by the 
ISP that makes available part of its capacity to other customers who 
may be within range of the Wi-Fi network), and did not include 
scenarios for users connecting to free public Wi-Fi and other       
Wi-Fi networks that do not require registration, and which are 
widely offered in the UK. We addressed these elements in our 
study.  
Jeske et al. [22] investigated factors that drive participants to 
choose one Wi-Fi network over others, and found that the absence 
or presence of the ‘padlock’ icon drove decision-making. This 
study assumed that participants are committed to connect to public 
Wi-Fi, and have no alternative (such as using mobile data). Our 
study addresses a different goal: we wanted to understand the 
process people go through, and the factors they consider in their 
decision to connect - or not - to a potentially unsecure Wi-Fi 
network when a more secure alternative is available. Yevseyeva et 
al. [47] proposed a model of the trade-offs involved in choosing 
between different Wi-Fi networks, but their model is not supported 
by empirical evidence. We wanted to better explain people’s 
decision making processes by using empirical evidence.  
There are general decision-making theories and frameworks that 
can be applied to understand why people use public Wi-Fi and 
accept the associated risks. One of them is the expected utility 
theory proposed by Von Neumann and Morgenstern [46] which is 
used widely in the game and economic behaviour literature and 
[36] is arguably the major paradigm in decision-making since 
World War II. It is a theory which [6] predicts a person’s choice, 
and [32] is particularly suited to analysing choice among risky 
alternatives. According to utility theory [6], people’s decisions are 
made to ensure that they maximise their expected utility. In the 
context of our study, it means that people decide to connect - or not 
- to public Wi-Fi networks to maximise expected utility (EUT) – 
i.e. they would want to catch up with work, or chores such as 
paying bills, and consume entertainment content when it is safe to 
do so. At the same time, we would not expect them to risk exposing 
credentials or private data.  
Hence, we formulated our 3rd hypothesis in line with expected 
utility theory. 
H3: People choose action that gives the highest expected utility, 
when deciding to connect, or not to connect, to public Wi-Fi. 
Our alternative hypothesis in this case, consistent with behavioural 
economics, is that people’s decisions around risk may 
systematically deviate from EUT.  
In this section, we present the related work. The next section, 
Section 3, discusses the methodology. 
3. METHODOLOGY 
Our study consists of three main parts. The first part investigates 
the extent of public Wi-Fi usage and the second part examines the 
security and privacy risks from using public Wi-Fi networks. The 
final part concerns examining people’s rationale for using public 
Wi-Fi and bearing the risks of data being compromised. The 
methodology for each part of the study is discussed in this section.  
3.1 The extent of public Wi-Fi usage 
The objectives of this part are to verify if people do connect to 
public Wi-Fi networks and, if so, to explore the nature of Internet 
transactions they perform. We setup a free open public Wi-Fi 
network at various locations in London and monitored the Wi-Fi 
traffic. The following sub sections explain the setup of the 
experimental Wi-Fi network.  
3.1.1 Setting up an experimental public Wi-Fi  
Our experimental Wi-Fi hotspot consisted of an Acer Windows 7 
operating system laptop, an iPad Air 2 Cellular (version 9.3.2), an 
O2 data sim card, a USB cable (for connecting an iPad to a laptop),  
Apple iTunes (version 12.3.3.17), and ARP Miner software 
(version 2.2.3). Apple iTunes provided a network driver that allows 
the laptop and the iPad to communicate and share the Internet 
connection. We used the ARP Miner software to create a captive 
portal, a login page which forces a user to accept the terms and 
conditions of usage before using our Wi-Fi network. This step is 
critical to meet the UCL Ethics Committee (IRB) requirement that 
we must obtain consent from every participant who tries to connect 
to the network (see 3.1.5 for ethics approval). 
To set up the experimental Wi-Fi network, we first inserted the O2 
data sim card into the iPad. Then we used the iPad’s built-in 
“Personal Hotspot” function to share the Internet connection with 
the Windows 7 laptop via a USB cable. Next, on our Windows 7 
laptop, we used the “Internet Connection Sharing” function to 
create an open Wi-Fi network called “Free London Wi-Fi” and use 




3.1.2  Monitoring Wi-Fi traffic  
We enabled the authentication log in the ARP Miner software to 
capture the Media Access Control (MAC) address of the 
participants’ device. This helped us to identify a unique number of 
devices connecting to our experimental Wi-Fi network. To monitor 
the Internet traffic, we installed WireShark (version 2.0.3, 64 bit), 
a network protocol analyser, on the Windows 7 laptop. After the 
participants had accepted the terms and conditions, traffic routing 
from the participants’ devices to the Internet via our experimental 
Wi-Fi network were captured by WireShark.  
3.1.3 Locations and duration of the experiment 
We set up our experimental open free public Wi-Fi network at 
various locations and times in central London. Since there is only 
one set of equipment, the experiment took place at one location at 
a time. Various types of locations, for example, train stations and 
popular tourist locations, were chosen to allow us to observe any 
potential differences in participants´ behaviour when they were 
using public Wi-Fi networks. The experiment was run for a total of 
150 hours over a period of one and a half months between May and 
June 2016. A summary of locations where the experiment took 
place and the hours of each experiment is in Table 1. 
Table 1. Locations and hours of the experiment 
Type of 
Location 
Location Hours of 
experiment 
Transport 
Waterloo Train Station 20 
Victoria - Bus Station 15 
King Cross Train Station 10 
Leisure 
Fulham Broadway Centre 15 
Leicester Square 15 
South Kensington 8 
South Bank 8 
Piccadilly Circus 6 
Tower of London 5 
Park 
Hyde Park 10 
St. James Park 8 
Regent Park 5 
Educational British Library 20 UCL Campus 5 
Total 150 
3.1.4 Analysing the result 
We identified a unique number of devices connecting to our 
experimental Wi-Fi networks by using the MAC address. We 
Figure 1. Components of the experimental free public 




differentiated the MAC addresses of devices attempting to connect 
to from the MAC address of those devices connected successfully 
(i.e. devices which the owners had accepted the terms and 
conditions of using our experimental Wi-Fi network) by 
segregating entries in the log that contain “Client Entries” and 
“Client Authorized” in the description field, respectively. We 
focused our analysis on the devices in the latter group as they were 
able to connect to the Internet.   
We used Microsoft Excel to sanitise and analyse traffic captured 
by WireShark. Since our goal was to examine the transactions that 
participants carried out when connected to our experimental Wi-Fi, 
data cleansing was critical to filter out, as far as possible, any 
irrelevant Internet traffic from the raw data. Irrelevant traffic 
included background traffic that was not directly initiated by users 
(such as captive portal traffic, routine broadcasting messages from 
the router to devices within the Wi-Fi network, operating system 
updates, background advertising or web analytics traffic, and 
potential malware traffic, if users’ devices were infected). Since 
there is no single source of information which lists all possible non-
user initiated traffic, we used a combination of sources such as 
Google Search Engine, Google Scholar, Wikipedia, mobile phone 
forums, and WireShark to help us identify these background jobs. 
Next, to identify potential websites or the applications used, we 
examined traffic entries classified as Domain Name System (DNS) 
protocol. As an example, a DNS entry which contains “Standard 
query 0x9870 A e11.whatsapp.net” in the info field indicates that 
a participant is using WhatsApp, a messaging application. Since 
there is no official database that can identify all DNS traffic and 
their corresponding websites or applications, and not all types of 
DNS traffic are publicly well-known, we used the Google search 
engine and other Internet sources discussed above to help us 
identify and verify the websites and the applications. 
3.1.5 Ethics Approval 
We submitted the study design to UCL’s Research Ethics 
Committee (IRB) prior to starting the fieldwork. Permission was 
granted provided participants accepted the Terms and Conditions, 
which explained that they would be connecting to the Internet using 
a captive portal technology. Participants had to agree that data such 
as IP address, MAC address, and network traffic would be 
collected. The data we collected were stored in an encrypted drive 
accessible only to the research team.  
3.2 Security and privacy risk of using public 
Wi-Fi  
To identify potential security and privacy risk from using public 
Wi-Fi networks, we inspected Internet packets passing through our 
experimental Wi-Fi network which were captured by WireShark. 
In particular, we searched for packets that contain sensitive 
information such as passwords, cookies, and packets that travelling 
through port 80, a standard port for unencrypted http traffic1.  
We also examined packets that travel through well-known email 
protocols: Internet Message Access Protocol (IMAP), Post Office 
Protocol (POP), and Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), as 
they could reveal the content of the emails if not configured 
correctly. 
                                                                
1 www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Port_80 
3.3 Reasons for using public Wi-Fi  
We adopted both qualitative and quantitative approaches to 
examine people’s rationale for connecting to unsecured public   
Wi-Fi network. Each method is discussed in turn. 
3.3.1 Qualitative study – user interview 
The main purposes of the interview are to understand participant’s 
rationales for using unsecure public Wi-Fi and to use the result to 
inform the design of the subsequent quantitative online survey.  
We advertised our study via flyers at various locations on the UCL 
campus, the Monthly UCL Student Newsletter (May 2016), the 
Department of Security and Crime Science (SCS) Twitter account, 
the Department of SCS MSc student mailing list, and London 
VISION Singers group. Interested participants were asked to fill 
out an online pre-screening questionnaire which allowed us to 
assemble a demographically balanced sample of participants.  
We interviewed 14 participants chosen from a range of 
demographic groups (Table 2). We gave information sheet to 
participant and obtain user consent prior to the interview. Each 
participant received £10 for a one-hour interview.  













Prefer not to say 1 
Education 
High School 3 
Diploma Training 1 
Bachelor’s Degree 5 





Nearly daily 3 
> a few (2-3) times/week 2 
< a few (2-3) times/week 6 
During the interview, we asked participants about their general 
perception and experience of using open public Wi-Fi networks, 
their perception of risks and security of public Wi-Fi, and their 
rationale when deciding to connect, or not to connect, to unsecure 
public Wi-Fi. We audio-recorded and transcribed each interview 
session. We then coded the interview response based on a defined 
group of categories designing to help us understand participants’ 
behaviour and rationale for using unsecured public Wi-Fi 
networks. 
3.3.2 Quantitative study - online survey 
We used a scenario-based online survey to examine a participant’s 
rationale when they decide to connect, or not to connect, to 
unsecure public Wi-Fi networks. We designed the survey questions 
to test our main research hypothesis that participants would choose 
the action that yields the highest expected utility. We created eight 
fictitious scenarios in which Internet access would be beneficial 
and - for each scenario - asked the participant to choose among 
three choices: a) connect to the Internet via a mobile data plan or 
data roaming, b) connect to the Internet via an open public Wi-Fi 
network, or c) not connect to the Internet.   
The eight fictitious scenarios cover different locations, types of 
transactions, degree of urgency (see Table 3). Within each 
scenario, there are four sub-scenarios where participants have 
100%, 75%, 50%, and 25% left on their mobile data plans or 
roaming. The survey also asked participants some general 
demographic questions, usage of the Internet, and perception of 
security risk and general risks. This is to allow us to subsequently 
evaluate correlation between these factors and their behaviour 
when using public Wi-Fi. 
Table 3.  Cases by transaction type, urgency, and location  
Case Type of 
Transaction 
Urgency Location 
I Non-financial  Non-urgent In the UK 
II Non-financial  Urgent In the UK 
III Financial  Non-urgent In the UK 
IV Financial  Urgent In the UK 
V Non-financial  Non-urgent Outside the UK 
VI Non-financial  Urgent Outside the UK 
VII Financial  Non-urgent Outside the UK 
VIII Financial  Urgent Outside the UK 
Expected utility is unobservable so we have assumed that expected 
utility will be a function of expected value. To enable us to 
calculate the expected value of each choice and subsequently 
compare whether the choice that the participants selected yields the 
highest utility per our hypothesis, our questions were designed to 
elicit the value of each variable, per generic expected value (EV) 
equation (See (1)) based on model proposed by Von Neumann and 
Morgenstern [46]. 
EV =p1(v1-c1) + p2(v2-c2) + … + pi(vi-ci)      (1)  
Where p is the probability of success for each choice, v is the 
expected value received if success, c is the cost associated with 
each choice, and i is the set of all possible outcomes.  
Applying the equation to our study, we have equations (1.1), (1.2), 
and (1.3) for the expected value of using public Wi-Fi (EVw), 
mobile data plan (EVm), and not connecting to the Internet at all 
(EVn), respectively.  
EVw = pw(vw-cw) + pws(vws-cws) + pwis(vwis-cwis)  (1.1) 
Where pw is the probability of connecting to the Internet via public 
Wi-Fi is successful which we assume it to be 1, vw is the 
participant’s expected value from connecting to the Internet, cw is 
the cost of free public Wi-Fi which we assume to be 0, pws is the 
participant’s perceived likelihood that data travel securely on 
public Wi-Fi (i.e. 1-pwis), vws is the participant’s expected value 
from connecting to the Internet securely, cws is the cost of acquiring 
secure connection which we assume it to be 0 (for simplicity of the 
model, secure connection is offered as free in all scenarios), pwis is 
the participant’s perceived likelihood that data can be 
compromised on public Wi-Fi, vwis is the participant’s expected 
value  if data is  compromised, and cwis is the cost of acquiring an 
insecure connection which is 0 (i.e. we assume that open public 
Wi-Fi is insecure so participant pays nothing for not connecting to 
secure service).    
EVm = pm(vm-cm) + pms(vms-cms) + pmis(vmis-cmis)  (1.2) 
Where pm is the probability of connecting to the Internet via mobile 
data is successful which we assume to be 1, vm is the participant’s 
expected value of connecting to the Internet, cm is the cost of using 
a mobile data plan, pms is the participant’s perceived likelihood that 
data travels securely on the mobile data network (i.e. 1-pmis), vms is 
the participant’s expected value of connecting to the Internet 
securely, cms is the cost of acquiring a secure connection which we 
assume to be 0 (for simplicity of the model, secure connection is 
offered as free in all scenarios), pmis is the participant’s perceived 
likelihood that data can be compromised on mobile data network, 
vmis is the participant’s expected value if data is compromised, and 
cmis is the cost of acquiring insecure connection which is 0 (i.e. we 
assume that open public Wi-Fi is insecure so the participant pays 
nothing for acquiring insecurity).    
EVn = pn(vn-cn)              (1.3) 
Where pn is the probability of not connecting to the Internet (which 
is always 1 as the participant has decided not to connect to the 
Internet), vn is the participant’s perceived utility of not connecting 
to the Internet, and cn is the cost of not connecting to the internet 
which is 0. 
For variables used to measure expected values (i.e. variable ‘v’ in 
(1.1), (1.2), and (1.3)), we designed the questions based on the 
concept of “Willingness to Pay (WTP)” and “Willingness to 
Accept (WTA)”. This concept is used widely in an economic 
analysis to derive empirical estimates of welfare measures [1]. In 
our study, the WTP refers to the maximum amount that the 
participant is willing to pay for an Internet connection, and for a 
secure Internet connection. The WTA, on the other hand, refers to 
the amount that an individual is willing to accept in exchange for 
giving up an Internet connection, and for a secure Internet 
connection, respectively. An example of case description and 
questions from scenario I are in Appendix A. 
A total of 106 participants were recruited via Prolific Academic 
(PA). We restricted our eligible participants to only those older 
than 18, currently living in the UK, and have a PA approval rate of 
no lower than 90%. Survey responses were refined to optimise data 
quality. Records that do not contain all required fields that have the 
same values for every variable were removed. We also removed a 
survey that failed both of our fatigue tests. After data cleansing, we 
have 102 responses from various demographic groups (Table 4). 
Table 4.  Demographic of online survey participants 
Main 
category 
Subcategory No. of 
participants 









Bachelor degree 43 
Completed high school 6 
Diploma 12 
High school graduate 25 
Postgraduate degree 16 
Employment 
Status 
Doing something else 9 
Full-time education 15 
Fully retired from work 5 
Unemployed 8 
In full-time employment 50 
In part-time employment  15 
We used Survey Gizmo (www.surveygizmo.com) to create the 
online survey. To optimise data quality, we embedded rules such 
as rejecting negative values for WTP and WTA. Moreover, we 
used a simple interface (sliding bar) to allow participants to choose 
a value between 0% and 100%. All participants were given the 
same eight scenarios. However, to minimise the anchoring effect 
and response bias, the order of the eight scenarios was selected 
randomly.  
For each participant and for each scenario, we calculated the 
expected value of each of the three choices given to the participant 
and determined if the participant had selected the choice that yields 
the highest expected value according to our hypothesis. Finally, we 
performed a binomial test and a binomial logistic regression using 
SPSS. We used binomial test (See (2)) to determine whether a 
proportion from a single dichotomous variable is equal to a 
presumed population value. In our study, it is to test whether 100% 
of our participants acts according to the utility theory per our 




√𝑝𝑝(1−𝑝𝑝)(1/n1+1/n2)            (2) 
Where p1 is the actual proportion of participants who act in 
accordance with the utility theory when deciding to connect (or 
not) to public Wi-Fi, p0 is the hypothetical proportion of 
participants (in our study, this is 100% per the hypothesis), p is the 
proportion of successes for the combined sample, n1 is the number 
of participants making a decision in line with the utility theory, and 
n2 is the number of participants whose actions do not align with the 
theory. 
We also used a binomial logistic regression analysis (See (3)) to 
assess the effects of independent variables (e.g. demographic 
variables), on participants’ decision making when it comes to 
deciding to connect, or not to connect, to unsecure public Wi-Fi.  
πi = Pr(Yi=1|Xi=xi) = exp(β0+β1xi)/1+exp(β0+β1xi)    (3) 
Where Y is a binary response variable, Yi = 1 if participant make a 
decision in line with utility theory, Yi = 0 if participant do not make 
a decision in line with the theory, X = (X1, X2,…, Xk) is the 
independent variables (e.g. age, gender, average use of online 
communication, etc.). 
Finally, we analysed the Nagelkerke R2 value to determine the 
percentage of variation in the dependent variables that is explained 
by the model.  
In this section, we discussed the methodology used in our study. 
The next section, Section 4, discusses the analysis of the results. 
4. ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
The following sections discussed the detailed results from each part 
of the study. 
4.1 Extent of public Wi-Fi usage 
We found evidence of participants connecting to our Wi-Fi for a 
variety of purposes. 
4.1.1 Result by location 
Participants connected to our experimental Wi-Fi at various 
locations. Overall, one device attempts to connect to our 
experimental Wi-Fi every two hours (0.43 device/hour), and one 
device connected successfully and used the Internet every four 
hours (0.23 device/hour). The rates of device connecting vary by 
location (Table 5). We did not observed any successful connections 
at UCL Campus, Fulham Broadway, Leicester Square, South 
Kensington, St. James Park, and Regent Park. 
However, we intentionally did not design these figures to be 
statistically comparable because our research question focuses on 
investigating whether people would connect to public Wi-Fi rather 
than statistically testing the differences in the extent among diverse 
locations. The latter would require a different research design 
which includes, for examples, classifying peak vs. non-peak time, 
and statistically testing the differences in mean among locations. 
Table 5. Connected devices by location 










Victoria Bus Station 15 1.07 0.73 
Tower of London 5 1.00 0.60 
Waterloo Station 20 1.00 0.60 
South Bank 8 0.38 0.25 
King Cross Station 10 0.50 0.20 
Piccadilly Circus 6 0.17 0.17 
British Library 20 0.25 0.10 
Hyde Park 10 0.10 0.10 
UCL Campus 5 0.00 0.00 
Fulham Broadway  15 0.07 0.00 
Leicester Square 15 0.20 0.00 
South Kensington 8 0.13 0.00 
St. James Park 8 0.38 0.00 
Regent Park 5 0.00 0.00 
Total 150 0.43 0.23 
4.1.2 Result by nature of transactions 
We found that participants carried out a range of activities whilst 
connecting to our experimental Wi-Fi. Google Search Engine, 
Facebook, Apple iTunes, WhatsApp, SnapChat, and Instagram are 
the most popular, accounting for nearly half of the total usage. We 
observed traffic to websites outside the UK (e.g. UOL Mail Brazil, 
Observador News Portugal, etc.) which indicate that participants 
connecting to our Wi-Fi network may be from overseas. Within the 
top ten most used websites/apps, we found traffic that we were 
unable to identify. They could be traffic from malware that were 
not well-known or traffic from private company not listed publicly 
on the Internet. Table 6 shows a list of the top ten websites/apps. 






Google Search  34 Instagram 7 
Facebook 20 Unknown 6 
Apple iTunes 18 Google Mail 6 
WhatsApp 13 Potential Malware 5 
SnapChat 7 Apple Facetime 5 
Total 121 
 
4.2 Security and privacy risk of using public 
Wi-Fi network 
We found no evidence of usernames and passwords being 
transmitted in the clear. However, we observed six 
applications/websites that leaked cookies that could compromise 
data privacy. These apps/webs include Instagram (Social 
Network), Yelp (Miscellaneous), Channel 4 (TV), Betfair (Online 
Gambling), Bumble (Online Dating), and Desperaco (Online 
News).  
The cookies from Instagram contain URL links to MP4 videos, 
which participants were watching whilst using our experimental 
Wi-Fi network. We were able to replay these videos by copying 
and pasting the links to a web browser. Similarly, in the cookies 
from TV station Channel 4 we extracted a list of TV shows viewed 
by participants. The cookies from Yelp and Desperaco contained 
links to the photos viewed by participants. For Betfair, the cookies 
contained data that could potentially be part of betting transactions.  
The cookies leaked from Bumble, an online dating application used 
by approximately 800,000 users as of August 2015 [31], contained 
private information and online dating history. We observed not 
only the profile information of the individual connecting to our 
experimental public Wi-Fi network, but also 29 other profiles that 
the individual had viewed. These profiles included information 
such as name, date of birth, photo, education, and sexual 
orientation, and, in some cases, an Instagram username which 
allows us to find out more information about him/her. We also 
noted that even though the URL links to profiles photo were 
configured as “https”, we could replace it with “http” in a web 
browser and view these photos without having to sign up or install 
Bumble application. An example of the cookie from Bumble is in 
Figure 2 with sensitive information redacted. 
 
Figure 2. An example of unencrypted sensitive information 
being sent from Bumble app. 
4.3 Reasons for using public Wi-Fi 
We discussed the results from both the quantitative and the 
qualitative studies in this section. 
4.3.1 Results from interviews 
More than 90% of our participants expressed concerns about public 
Wi-Fi security, and, among those, more than 50% of participants 
use public Wi-Fi networks regardless, despite being aware of the 
risk. However, when asked about the rationale for their behaviour, 
the responses varied. 
The most common reason given is that it is free. For example, 
Participant No. 5 (P5) said “When we were in Australia, it [the    
Wi-Fi] was £10/hour and we found that by going to a post office 
there are [free] Wi-Fi hotspots and we told everyone to go to [the] 
Wi-Fi hotspots.  Again, that’s probably not secure but it’s [better] 
than paying for Wi-Fi at the hotel”. P13 also shared a similar 
rationale “Sometimes, on Wi-Fi, you are afraid that data transfer 
might not be safe. You have no control who is receiving on the other 
side. But well, it’s free”. 
However, some participants could not precisely explain their 
rationale. For instances, P8 explained, "It’s weird ‘cos I know it can 
happen that people can track you [when you use public Wi-Fi] but 
still I connect to it”. P5 also explained her rationale as “It [public 
Wi-Fi security] is in the back of my mind but I don’t consciously 
[think about it]…if I want to access it [public Wi-Fi], I access it”. 
P2 said that “At the time, I just don’t think about it. I just think 
about I want to use the Wi-Fi”. 
4.3.2 Result from online survey 
Regardless of the urgency and the nature of transactions and the 
location where the scenario takes place, we found that, in most 
cases, a large proportion of participants consistently do not make 
choices as predicted by the expected utility theory when deciding 
to connect (or not) to public Wi-Fi and these results are statistically 
significant.  
For general non-urgent non-financial transactions (case I) and 
urgent non-financial transactions (case II) where the scenario 
located the user in the UK, we observed that participants choose 
the option that gives them highest expected value in urgent 
situations when they still have 100% and 75% left of their mobile 
data plan. The reverse behaviour was observed when they had 50% 
and 25% left.  
When the scenario located the user outside the UK (case V for non-
urgent and case VI for urgent non-financial transactions), however, 
participants consistently do not choose the option that gives them 
highest expected value regardless of how much roaming mobile 
data they have left. In each scenario, the binomial test showed that 
the proportion of participants who make choices per the utility 
theory significantly deviates (p < 0.001) from the presumed 
population value of 100% (Table 7 and 8).  
Therefore, overall, there is sufficient evidence to reject the claim 
that people choose action that gives the highest expected value, 
when deciding to connect, or not to connect, to public Wi-Fi, 
particularly for making general non-financial transactions. 




Group* Case I  
UK 






100% 1 31 0.30 44 0.43 2 71 0.70 58 0.57 
75% 1 32 0.31 45 0.44 2 70 0.69 57 0.56 
50% 1 38 0.37 47 0.46 2 64 0.63 55 0.54 
25% 1 48 0.47 52 0.51 2 54 0.53 50 0.49 












100% 1 33 0.32 36 0.35 2 69 0.68 66 0.65 
75% 1 33 0.32 32 0.31 2 69 0.68 70 0.69 
50% 1 37 0.36 35 0.34 2 65 0.64 67 0.66 
25% 1 37 0.36 42 0.41 2 65 0.64 60 0.59 
*Group 1 is a group of participants making choice according to the utility 
theory, Group 2 is a group of participants not making choice according to 
the theory.**All result significant at p < 0.001. 
For financial transactions (Case III-non urgent in the UK, Case IV-
urgent in the UK, Case VII-non-urgent outside the UK, and Case 
VIII-urgent outside the UK), a statistically significant proportion 
of participants consistently make choices not predicted by expected 
utility theory when asked to decide whether to connect, or not to 
connect, to public Wi-Fi networks to execute the transactions. We 
noted that regardless of how much data plan/roaming the 
participants had, they did not select option that yield the highest 
expected utility. More participants made the same decision in the 
scenarios that took place overseas.  In each scenario, the statistical 
binomial tests show that the proportion of participants making 
choices according to the expected utility theory deviates 
significantly (p < 0.001) from the presumed population value of 
100% (Table 9 and 10).  Therefore, there is sufficient evidence to 
reject the claim that people choose action that gives the highest 
expected utility, when deciding to connect, or not to connect, to 
public Wi-Fi, particularly for making financial transactions.  












100% 1 33 0.32 36 0.35 2 69 0.68 66 0.65 
75% 1 34 0.33 36 0.35 2 68 0.67 66 0.65 
50% 1 36 0.35 36 0.35 2 66 0.65 66 0.65 
25% 1 46 0.45 43 0.42 2 56 0.55 59 0.58 












100% 1 24 0.24 20 0.20 2 78 0.76 82 0.80 
75% 1 24 0.24 21 0.21 2 78 0.76 81 0.79 
50% 1 24 0.24 19 0.19 2 78 0.76 83 0.81 
25% 1 30 0.29 25 0.25 2 72 0.71 77 0.75 
*Group 1 is a group of participants making choice according to the utility 
theory, Group 2 is a group of participants not making choice according to 
the theory.**All result significant at p < 0.001. 
The results from binomial logistic regressions show a statistically 
significant correlation between the participants’ decision making 
not in line with the expected utility theory and certain demographic 
factors, particularly gender, employment status, and perception 
toward security of public Wi-Fi in general.    
a. Gender 
Females are more likely to make choices not predicted by expected 
utility theory when asked to decide whether to connect, or not to 
connect, to public Wi-Fi networks. We noted statistically 
significant correlations in 11 instances across 6 scenarios. For 
examples, in Scenario II where participants were asked to connect 
to an open public Wi-Fi to make general non-financial transactions 
in an urgent situation in the UK, females were 7.02 times (β=1.95, 
OR=7.02, p<0.05) and 5.82 times (β=1.76, OR=5.82, p<0.05) more 
likely to not choosing the acts that would yield the highest expected 
value when they have 75% and 50% left on their mobile data 
allowance, respectively. Scenario VI presented a similar situation 
but, in this case, the scenario took place abroad. We noted that 
females also were 7.59 times (β=2.03, OR=7.59, p<0.05)  and 7.27 
times (β=1.98, OR=7.27, p<0.05)  more likely to make choices not 
predicted by expected utility theory when they have 100% and 
75%, respectively, left on their data roaming allowance. 
Females are also more likely than male to decide to connect to 
public Wi-Fi, rating the likelihood that public Wi-Fi networks 
might be compromised higher (Table 11). When the scenarios 
located participants in the UK, despite having 100% and 75% left 
on data allowance plan, female were 3.67 times (β=1.30, OR=3.67, 
p<0.01) and 4.33 times (β=1.47, OR=4.33, p<0.01), respectively, 
more likely to decide to connect to public Wi-Fi to make non-
urgent non-financial transactions. Similarly, for non-urgent 
financial transactions, female were 8.40 times (β=2.13, OR=8.40, 
p<0.01) and 5.84 times (β=1.77, OR=5.84, p<0.01) more likely to 
make the same decision when having 100% and 75% left on data 
plan, respectively. In case of urgent financial transactions, female 
were also 4.60 times (β=1.53, OR=4.60, p<0.05) more likely to 
connect to public Wi-Fi when they have 75% left on data plan 
allowance. However, for scenarios that placed participants outside 
the UK, this was only the case for urgent non-financial 
transactions. Female were 2.72 times (β=0.99, OR=2.72, p<0.05) 
more likely to use public Wi-Fi even when they have 100% of their 
data plan left (see Table 12). 
Table 11. Perceived likelihood that public Wi-Fi can be 
compromised by gender (on a scale of 1-100%) 
Location Case 
% that public Wi-Fi can 
be compromised  Mean  differences Female Male 
UK 
I 48.80 37.64 11.16* 
II 50.35 40.21 10.14 
III 59.45 51.67 7.78 
IV 59.47 50.62 8.85 
Outside 
UK 
V 57.73 42.31 15.42** 
VI 55.95 44.62 11.33* 
VII 67.57 58.86 8.71 
VIII 67.35 56.79 10.56* 
Table 12. Result from binomial logistic regression for the 
decision to connect to public Wi-Fi by Gender 
Location Case 
Logistic probability of 
connecting to public Wi-Fi 
(Reference group = Female) 
100% 75% 50% 25% 
UK 
I 3.66** 4.33** 5.27** 2.24 
II 1.53 2.60 1.53 1.41 
III 8.40** 5.84** 4.79* 2.32 
IV 3.75 4.60* 4.60* 2.36 
Outside UK 
V 1.40 1.77 1.31 1.06 
VI 2.72* 2.24 2.93* 2.69* 
VII 3.33 3.01 3.01 1.50 
VIII 1.44 1.18 2.14 1.32 
***, **, * Significant at p < 0.001, p < 0.01, and p < 0.05, respectively. 
b. Employment status  
Students are more likely to make choices inconsistent with 
expected utility theory compared to unemployed individuals (the 
reference group). We observed a statistically significant 
correlations in 6 instances across 2 scenarios. For example, in case 
IV where participants were asked to connect to a public Wi-Fi 
network to make urgent financial transactions in the UK, students 
were 149.76 times (β=5.01, OR=149.76, p<0.05) and 462.72 times 
(β=6.14, OR=462.72, p<0.05) more likely to make choices 
inconsistent with expected utility theory when they have 100% and 
75% left of their mobile data allowance, respectively. 
In case V, on the other hand, where participants were asked to make 
a non-urgent non-financial transaction outside the UK, students 
were 55.05 times (β=4.01, OR=55.05, p<0.05) more likely to make 
choices inconsistent with expected utility theory when they have 
50% left on their roaming data allowance. We noted that in 
Scenario III, where participants were asked to make financial 
transactions in a non-urgent situation in the UK, participants with 
a “part-time” employment status were 0.3 times (β=-3.38, OR=0.3, 
p<0.05) less likely to make choices inconsistent with expected 
utility theory than an unemployed individual. 
c. General perception of public Wi-Fi security 
We noted a statistically significant correlation between 
participants’ perception of public Wi-Fi security and their choice 
of actions, inconsistent with expected utility theory, in 14 instances 
across 5 scenarios. For example, in case VIII, which we asked 
participants to decide to connect to a public Wi-Fi to make urgent 
financial transactions overseas, we found that for every 1% 
increase in the participants´ perception of riskiness, an individual 
is 0.92 times (β=-0.08, OR=0.92, p<0.001) and 0.93 times           
(β=-0.08, OR=0.93, p<0.001) less likely to make choices 
inconsistent with expected utility theory when they have 100% and 
75% left on mobile data roaming, respectively.   
In the next section, Section 5, we will discuss how we can apply 
the knowledge obtained from this study. 
5. DISCUSSION 
The following sections discuss the insight and possible future 
works from our study as well as the limitations. Each is discussed 
in turn. 
5.1 Security and privacy implications 
Our study confirmed that people still use unsecure public Wi-Fi, 
and that they take security risks in doing so – we found several 
examples of sensitive information being transmitted insecurely. 
These findings add further evidence to the result from previous 
studies which endorsed the extent of public Wi-Fi usage ([5], [12], 
[20], [23], [12], [29], [34], [35]) and the security and privacy 
implication from using such networks ([3], [7], [11], [12], [15], 
[33], [37], [39]).  
We show that users can be vulnerable to privacy attacks when using 
public Wi-Fi. For users who may already be aware of the risks of 
using public Wi-Fi, the real-life privacy leak demonstrated in our 
study could help to further increase the level of their understanding. 
However, many of our participants  assumed that public Wi-Fi 
within the UK is secure – perhaps because they assume that UK 
providers follow regulations or codes of practice and that users 
have trust in the environment they are familiar with [27]. We need 
to raise awareness that rogue Wi-Fi exists, that attackers 
impersonate trustworthy providers, and that even with reputable 
                                                                
2 www.cyberaware.gov.uk  
providers, there are security and privacy risks unless users deploy 
additional mechanisms, such as a Virtual Private Network (VPN). 
The risks they encounter while using public Wi-Fi is not visible, 
and most people do not realise that seemingly non-risky activities 
like browsing or search can reveal sensitive data. Installing privacy 
reminder software - such as the Wi-Fi Privacy Ticker, which 
displays information about sensitive terms that are sent from the 
user’s devices, and prevents the unencrypted transmission of these 
terms – could help to raise awareness ‘just in time’ [13].   
Understanding that people do connect devices to the network 
should be of concern to businesses who are adopting or thinking 
about deploying a BYOD (‘Bring Your Own Device’) policy. 
Under such a policy, users use the same devices for both business 
and personal purposes, potentially making corporate data 
vulnerable if users connect to insecure public Wi-Fi. Organisations 
should consider enforcing the use of VPNs when employees 
connect to corporate networks and ensuring that users are aware of 
the risks to corporate data when using their devices on public       
Wi-Fi networks. 
To protect user security and privacy and to mitigate the risk of 
software developers failing to comply with data protection laws, 
the procedure to test software should be more stringent. It should 
include a comprehensive set of test cases to ensure that data will be 
transmitted securely not only on the wired network but also on 
public Wi-Fi network and mobile data. Previous studies have 
shown that users – faced with many competing demands on their 
time and cognitive resources - try to minimise to effort they expend 
on security ([19], [24]). The usability of security mechanisms is 
another challenge faced by users as many of those mechanisms 
create an overhead for users or are too difficult to use ([2], [30]). 
Therefore, the responsibility to protect the security and privacy of 
data should be placed more on the software providers. A recent 
good example is WhatsApp rolling out an automatic and inherent 
end-to-end encryption, so users do not have to make the decision 
of encrypting their conversations [40]. The same should be applied 
to other applications, particularly Bumble, the online dating app, 
we found to have leaked sensitive user information in our study. 
The UK government may consider integrating the security and 
privacy risks from using public Wi-Fi to their existing cyber 
security awareness campaigns such as Cyber Aware2 where, the 
advice about public Wi-Fi is very limited. The simple message 
could be – “use your data plan for sensitive transactions- that’s 
what it’s there for”. The advice should also cover the scenarios 
when people go abroad - we found that participants are more likely 
to use public Wi-Fi to save money instead of paying for expensive 
data roaming. Perhaps, working with authorities responsible for 
transport hubs – could display ads to remind people of the risks of 
using free public Wi-Fi whilst on vacation. Demonstrations of how 
easy it is to set up a rogue Wi-Fi network and monitor people’s 
traffic, as demonstrated in our study, would make the risks more 
visible (a similar approach was used by some broadband providers 
to convince home users to secure their routers). There are other 
tools that could be helpful - detecting an evil twin Wi-Fi access 
points can be performed using tools such as EvilAP Defender [45]. 
Public policy makers could use the evidence found in this study to 
establish rules and regulations to promote security and privacy on 
public Wi-Fi networks. First, as this study has demonstrated that 
data privacy could be compromised, the policy makers in the UK 
may consider analysing the pros and cons of allowing insecure 
public Wi-Fi to be set up as demonstrated in the German criminal 
court ordering all wireless owners to secure their networks by 
requiring passwords or registration for accessing in 2010. As of 
September 2016 [43], the European Court of Justice is still in 
favour of such decision and rule that open Wi-Fi hotspots need 
password to promote security.   
5.2 Rationale for using public Wi-Fi 
Our study provides empirical evidence that a significant proportion 
of participants’ decisions about whether or not to connect to 
insecure public Wi-Fi network, are inconsistent with expected 
utility theory. This is an original piece of research exploring an 
aspect of decision-making not previously explored in studies 
investigating the decision-making process for using public Wi-Fi 
([16], [17], [18], [22], [28], [38], [47]) or in more general studies 
of expected utility theory [46]. Our results are in line with 
behavioural economics literature which argues that expected utility 
theory is inconsistent with the styles of decision-making that 
people actually adopt in many real-life choice situations [25]. It 
supports criticism of expected utility theory, especially its 
assumptions that people are well behaved, and make rational, 
utility maximising choices [4] [42]. Behavioural economists argue 
that expected utility theory is associated with faulty predictions 
about people's decisions in many real-life choice situations and 
rational choice theory, whilst possibly the most influential 
economic theory of decision-making, fails to describe the world in 
which we actually live [25] [41].  
Moreover, our novel contribution is that we were able to identify 
demographic and contextual factors that significantly influence 
participants to undervalue the security risks to preserve a resource 
that – rationally speaking – they have plenty of. In our survey, 
females were most likely to make risky choices even when they 
have 100% and 75% left on their mobile data plans and despite 
them perceiving a higher probability that public Wi-Fi networks 
can be compromised. This result contradicts with general 
perception and numbers of literatures observing greater risk-taking 
tendency in male ([9] [10] [21]). Possible explanations might be 
that women have lower levels of digital literacy and/or are less 
obsessive in their adoption of digital “hygiene” guidelines. A 
‘resource preservation heuristic’, which mostly likely drives many 
of their daily decisions, has created a habit of trying to save their 
data plan whenever possible. Another driver is the plausibility that, 
in people’s minds, quantifying lost from using mobile data 
allowance in monetary term is easier than quantifying potential lost 
from security/privacy breach caused by using free public Wi-Fi.  
5.3 Future studies 
The discovery of cookies leaking sensitive information whilst 
HTTPS is being used, whilst not completely new discovery, adds 
further evidence that HTTPS is not as secure as it is portrayed. In 
the case of Bumble, where the leak was observed in this study, date 
of birth and other sensitive information were pulled directly from 
the user’s Facebook profile [8]. Therefore, the entire connection 
between the two applications should, in theory, be encrypted.  
Investigation into the root causes and remediation plan of these 
vulnerabilities presents an opportunity for future study. A similar 
study to explore any leaked information in different settings such 
as in developing countries where mobile usage is growing 
substantially whilst general cyber security is trying to catch up 
presents another research opportunity. 
For the economics and security research community, the findings 
that participants in our study do not make choices as predicted by 
utility theory when deciding to connect, or not connect, to public 
Wi-Fi suggest that researchers need to consider the values that 
drive the behaviours of different demographic groups. Another 
area worth exploring is the sources of behaviour bias, which 
explains the divergence between the willingness to pay (WTP) and 
the willingness to accept (WTA) when people decide to use public 
Wi-Fi. Finally, investigating the resource preservation heuristic 
attitude and its effect on the risk taking behaviour in a wider 
computer security context is promising.  
5.4 Limitations 
Like other studies, our research has inherent limitations that readers 
should note when making any inference. First, for the public Wi-Fi 
monitoring experiment, the findings are based on data collected in 
central London which may not fully represent the behaviours of 
people outside London and outside the UK. Moreover, there may 
be more privacy leak from data transmitting through our 
experimental Wi-Fi but the keywords used to filter data during the 
analysis may not cater for it. The sample size for our interviews is 
relatively small, 14 in total. A larger sample size may be needed to 
represent the overall UK population. 
For survey questionnaires, despite our efforts to promote good 
quality responses such as using engaging scenarios, enforcing data 
checks, randomising the order of the questions, and using fatigue 
test, there is an inherent risk that participants might not fully pay 
attention to the questions. And we are asking for hypothetical 
behaviour, rather than observing the behaviour itself. Also, for 
simplicity, we used a set of assumptions that may not always reflect 
real life. For example, we assumed that if user decides to connect 
to the Internet via public Wi-Fi, the connection will always work. 
This is not always the case in real life where experience has shown 
us that public Wi-Fi networks do not always work. Moreover, and 
perhaps most importantly, the nature of the questionnaires means 
that users may respond with what they think they would do, but 
they may behave differently in a real life scenario. For the 
econometric analysis, unravelling correlation and causation is 
problematic and some of the results may reflect influences from 
underlying variables. Fuller exploration of larger data-sets would 
give us more information about the ultimate causal factors. 
Finally, the design of our study is restricted by the limitations faced 
by the expected utility theory approach and its assumptions implicit 
around risks which assume people have stable risk preference and 
do not have behavioural bias. Evidence from behavioural 
economics have consistently undermine such assumptions. The 
most prominent argument is the endowment effect whereby people 
perceive a loss of utility from giving up a valued good greater than 
the gain in utility from acquiring the same good, hence, creating a 
divergence between the willingness to pay and the willingness to 
accept [4]. 
In this section, we discuss the application of knowledge obtained 
from our study and the limitations in our study. The next section, 
Section 6, presents the conclusion. 
6. CONCLUSION 
We investigated the extent of public Wi-Fi usage and security and 
privacy implications from connecting to such networks using real 
life user generated data gathered from various locations in London, 
UK. We also examined reasons for using unsecure public Wi-Fi 
and bearing the risk of data being compromised, both from a 
quantitative approach based around expected utility theory, and a 
qualitative approach using user interviews.     
We found that participants did connect to public Wi-Fi to perform 
various activities and that some applications and websites leaked 
cookies that contained personal information. Further studies to 
understand the root cause and remediation actions for such failure 
presents a research opportunity. Examining rationale for using 
public Wi-Fi and bearing the risk of data being compromised 
shows that our participants, female in particular, indicated that they 
would use public Wi-Fi despite expressing concern over the 
security of the networks. Our findings that significant proportion 
of our participants make choices not predicted by utility theory 
supports a criticism made by behavioural economists that the 
expected utility theory fails to present a decision-making process 
of a ‘real’ human. Future studies to develop a more in-depth 
understanding of such behaviour in the context of public Wi-Fi 
security and information security, in general, are promising. 
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Appendix A: An example of case description 
and questions from scenario I. 
You are waiting for a friend at a train station in the UK. When you 
arrive there, you see that the train is running 1 hour late. You want 
to check messages on messaging apps (e.g. WhatsApp) or emails 
on your mobile phone but you do NOT urgently need to contact 
anyone in particular. You last checked your messages about two 
hours ago.  However, you do NOT have a data plan on your mobile 
phone. 
Q: What is the maximum amount (per hour) would you be willing 
to pay to connect to the Internet in this scenario? 
Suppose you decided to connect to free public Wi-Fi as described 
above and have connected successfully. At that point, before you 
actually use the Internet, the Wi-Fi router has reached its capacity 
and cannot accept any more user. However, successfully connected 
users, like yourself, can carry on with the connection without any 
problem. The Wi-Fi provider offers anyone who is willing to give 
up the connection a compensation in cash.   
Q: What is the minimum amount (per hour) would you be willing 
to accept in exchange for giving up your Internet access? 
Suppose you also have a 4G data plan on your mobile phone. You 
already have paid £10 for 1GB which has no expiration date. The 
4G connection works properly. Using the Internet in this case will 
use about 100MB of your data plan (i.e. 10% of 1GB allowance).   
Q: Would you connect to the Internet in this case, and via which 
means (i.e. data plan or free public Wi-Fi) when you have 100%, 
75%, 50%, and 25% left on your data plan? 
Q: From your perspective, what is the likelihood (1-100%) that 
security could be compromised when using mobile data plan to 
connect to the Internet in this case? 
Q: From your perspective, what is the likelihood (1-100%) that 
security could be compromised when using free open public Wi-Fi 
to connect to the Internet in this case?  
Suppose you can connect to the Internet securely by using an end-
to-end encryption service like Virtual Private Network (VPN). 
However, you have to pay for such a service. 
Q: What is the maximum amount (per hour) would you be willing 
to pay for such a service? 
Q: What is the minimum amount (per hour) would you be willing 
to accept in exchange for giving up secure Internet connection?  
